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"Split Definitive" 
Slate 
November 11, 2011 
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins 
For the first time in a century, the Supreme 
Court is divided solely by political party. 
All eyes are on the Supreme Court this week 
as it considers what to do with the landmark 
lawsuits challenging President Obama's 
health care legislation. While the question 
that intrigues court watchers is whether the 
nine justices will transcend their reputations 
as liberals or conservatives, it is a little-
noticed irony that, for the first time in more 
than a century, the ideological positions of 
the justices on today's Supreme Court can 
be identified purely by party affiliation. 
What that means is that, for the first time in 
our political lifetimes, each of the four 
Democratic appointees has a strong 
tendency to favor liberal outcomes, while 
the five Republicans typically take 
conservative positions. 
The days of liberal Republicans and 
conservative Democrats are behind us, and 
the days of judicial moderates from either 
party may soon seem a relic of the past. 
What does that mean for the future of the 
Affordable Care Act, and for the court 
itself? 
This change has been brewing for some 
time, but with the August 2010 confirmation 
of Elena Kagan to succeed liberal 
Republican John Paul Stevens, the deal was 
sealed. In its 2010-11 term, the Court 
divided along partisan lines to a striking 
degree. An unusually high propOliion of 
cases (18 out of 75) were decided by 5-4 
votes on at least some portion of the 
outcome (or 5-3, with Justice Elena Kagan 
recused because of her work as solicitor 
general). In 12 of those cases, including 
many of last term's most impOliant rulings, 
the court's Republicans were all arrayed on 
one side, its Democrats on the other. These 
cases involved regulation of campaign 
funding the right to sue for violations of 
rights by a prosecutor's office, and state 
powers to enforce restrictions on 
immigration. 
Far more telling, George W. Bush's and 
Barack Obama's appointees are patiicularly 
likely both to agree with each other and 
disagree with the other pair. According to 
data compiled by the SCOTUS Blog, 
Obama nominees Kagan and Sonia 
Sotomayor voted together 94 percent of the 
time last term; Bush nominees Samuel Alito 
and Chief Justice John Roberts were aligned 
96 percent of the time. By contrast, these 
two pairs disagreed with each other more 
than 30 percent of the time overall (an 
extremely high percentage considering that 
more than 60 percent of the decisions were 
either unanimous or 8-1). 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, a Ronald Reagan 
appointee, is generally thought of as the 
"swing" justice on the coUti, one who stands 
between the four justices to the left of him 
and the four to his right. That depiction of 
Kennedy is basically accurate. Last term, 
Kennedy was in the majority in all but two 
of the Court's 5-4 decisions. But that doesn't 
mean Kennedy stood equidistant from the 
Court's liberals and conservative blocs. His 
rates of agreement on the Court's judgment 
in the 2010 term ranged from 83 percent to 
90 percent with the other four Republicans; 
his rates of agreement with the Democrats 
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ranged from 66 percent to 74 percent. 
At one level, none of this seems very 
surprising. We have become accustomed to 
a political world that features strong 
polarization between the parties. Congress is 
sharply and bitterly divided along partisan 
lines, and President Obama has achieved 
little success in winning Republican votes 
for his major initiatives. Why should the 
Supreme Court be any different? But that 
obscures the fact that, at least until last year, 
the Supreme Court was different. The cOUli 
has often featured close divisions between 
ideological factions, but those divisions have 
usually crossed party lines rather than 
following them. Going back at least as far as 
the late 19th century, there has never been 
another year on the court like the 2010 term, 
when there was a contingent of Republican 
conservatives on one side and a contingent 
of Democratic liberals on the other side. 
Indeed, what's striking is how far the cOUli 
has departed from this sort of paliisan 
polarization. The "Four Horsemen" who 
regularly voted to strike down New Deal 
legislation in the 1930s included a 
Democrat-Woodrow Wilson appointee 
James McReynolds-and the three justices 
who most regularly opposed those men 
included two Republican appointees-
Harlan Fiske Stone and Benjamin Cardozo. 
In the famously "liberal" Warren Court of 
the 1950s and 1960s, which adopted a wide 
array of new rules expanding legal 
protections for civil liberties, two of the 
leaders in that effort were selected by 
President Eisenhower-William Brennan 
and Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. For 
their part, the justices who questioned much 
of the court's civil liberties revolution at that 
time included FDR appointee Felix 
Frankfurter and, later, Kennedy appointee 
Byron White. 
As the court gradually moved to the right 
beginning in the 1970s, White abetted much 
of that effOli while Republican appointees 
such as John Paul Stevens, David Souter, 
and (in the later portion of his career) Harry 
Blackmun stood in the liberal opposition, 
while other Republicans such as Sandra Day 
O'Connor and Lewis Powell took relatively 
moderate positions. 
What, then, brought about the partisan court 
of the 2010 term? The simple answer is 
changes in the selection process of justices. 
From the 1940s until the election of Ronald 
Reagan, the political parties were anything 
but polarized. Conservative Southern 
Democrats and liberal Rockefeller 
Republicans were important counterweights 
within both parties. Indeed, George Wallace 
justified his third-party bid for president in 
1968 by saying that "there's not a dime's 
wOlih of difference between the Democrat 
and Republican parties." 
Supreme Court appointments reflect these 
larger trends. Before party polarization took 
hold, ideology was not the controlling factor 
in court appointments. Presidents gave 
attention to other considerations, such as 
rewarding political allies, appealing to 
voters, and avoiding confirmation battles in 
the Senate. For those reasons, Democratic 
presidents have often selected justices who 
turned out to be conservative, and a good 
many Republican appointees turned out to 
be liberal. 
President Harry Truman's choices of 
relatively conservative nominees reflected 
his interest in rewarding political associates 
rather than choosing reliable liberals. And 
President Eisenhower's choices of Warren 
and Brennan resulted largely from political 
(but not ideological) considerations. Warren 
helped Eisenhower secure the 1952 
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Republican presidential nomination; 
Brennan was appointed to the court's so-
called Catholic seat because Eisenhower 
wanted to appoint a Democrat to 
demonstrate his ability to transcend political 
partisanship. Kennedy appointed White, his 
deputy attorney general and a longtime 
supporter (dating back to White's writing 
the intelligence report on the sinking of a 
boat piloted by Kennedy during World War 
II). Richard Nixon, although criticizing 
Warren court criminal justice rulings, 
discounted ideology in his efforts to appoint 
a Southerner to the court. Gerald Ford's 
appointment of John Paul Stevens was 
directly linked to Watergate and Ford's need 
to rise above politics. 
This pattern continued even as the larger 
political system was becoming more 
polarized. Strongly conservative Ronald 
Reagan chose relatively moderate Sandra 
Day O'Connor because there was only a 
small pool of credible Republican women 
from whom to choose. More striking, 
Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese 
thought the pool of conservative 
Republicans so weak that he set about to 
devise strategies to deepen that pool for 
future presidents. 
Today, appointment strategies have 
changed. As politics has become even more 
polarized, presidents have given greater 
emphasis to the goal of choosing 
ideologically reliable justices. More than 
anything, Republican presidents are now 
under great pressure to appoint true blue 
conservatives. From 1969 to 1991, even 
though Republicans appointed 12 justices 
(and Democrats none), the court frequently 
backed liberal outcomes. By 2001, when 
George W. Bush became president, the 
rallying call of conservative Republicans 
was "No More Souters." Indeed, when Bush 
initially chose Harriet Miers for what 
became Alito's seat, vehement criticism 
from conservatives who doubted her 
ideological reliability figured into Miers' 
decision to quickly withdrew, underlining 
changes in the political atmosphere. 
For their part, Bill Clinton and Barack 
Obama have contributed to the court's 
partisan divides by nominating four liberals 
to the court. And while some Democratic 
pmtisans lament that these justices are 
nothing like earlier liberals such as William 
Brennan or Thurgood Marshall, it is 
nonetheless true that today's Democratic 
nominees are distinctly to the left of all their 
Republican colleagues. 
All this could change. But it's unlikely 
unless and until pmtisan polarization 
declines. Future appointments, like the most 
recent ones, will emphasize ideological 
reliability over anything else. And because 
presidents will look for nominees whose 
ideological views are deeply rooted, the 
justices who are selected will be less likely 
to move toward moderation after they join 
the court. 
The court's strong polarization does not 
necessarily mean that the justices will divide 
strictly along partisan lines when they 
address the constitutional challenge to the 
healthcare law. Even on politically 
controversial issues, the court frequently 
depmts from such paltisan divisions. But 
because the COUlt is now composed solely of 
Democratic liberals and Republican 
conservatives, decisions that follow partisan 
lines have become far more likely. If this 
situation continues, as we think it will, the 
most powerful effects may be on how 
Americans think about the Supreme Court as 
an institution. 
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"Chief Justice Roberts and the Changing 
Conservative Legal Movement" 
The Witherspoon Institllte 
July 10, 2012 
Joel Alicea 
The clash between Chief Justice Robe11s' 
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is 
best seen as a clash between two visions of 
judicial restraint, and two eras of the 
conservative legal movement. 
At the sprightly age of 57 and less than 
seven years into his term as chief justice, 
John Roberts looks like a man whom time 
has left behind. The reaction among legal 
conservatives to the Roberts opinion in 
National Federation of Independent 
BlIsinesses v. Sebelills (the healthcare case) 
has been brutal. Many have accused the 
chief justice of exchanging the black robes 
of the jurist for the trappings of the 
politician. The chief justice is said to have 
"blinked" and "failed [his] most basic 
responsibility." Noted originalist scholar 
Mike Rappaport strongly implied that 
Robe11s is "both a knave and a fool." The 
cataloguing could go on. 
As much as these reactions reveal about 
differing views on a hotly contested question 
of constitutional law, they are at least as 
interesting because of what they say about 
the state of the conservative legal 
movement. Today's legal conservatives 
view the chief justice'S opinion as judicial 
abdication, but it was not too long ago that 
the philosophy reflected in Roberts' opinion 
would have been conservative orthodoxy. 
The truth is that the conservative legal 
movement's conception of judicial restraint 
has changed, departing from the view it held 
when it emerged from the constitutional 
wilderness to which it had been banished 
during the Warren Court. NFIB v. Sebelills 
displays a conservative legal movement in 
transition-and one that is increasingly 
leaving the judicial restraint in Roberts' 
opinion behind. 
Roberts lays down a theory of judicial 
restraint early in his opinion. Quoting his 
nineteenth-century brethren, the chief justice 
states: "'Proper respect for a co-ordinate 
branch of the government' requires that we 
strike down an Act of Congress only if 'the 
lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] 
act in question is clearly demonstrated. '" 
Justice John Marshall Harlan eloquently 
voiced this view of judicial restraint in his 
dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905). 
Harlan argued that a statute must be "plainly 
and palpably unauthorized by law" to be 
held unconstitutional. One of the 
Progressive Movement's titanic figures-
Felix Frankfurter-would adopt this as his 
mantra and carry it onto the Supreme Court. 
There he would watch his fellow New Deal 
justices turn against the principle preached 
by anti-Lochner jurists for a generation. By 
the time Frankfurter retired in 1962, the 
Warren Com1's revolution in constitutional 
law was well under way. 
It was precisely this revolution that inspired 
a counterrevolution: the conservative legal 
movement. Robert Bork's 1971 Indiana Law 
Journal article calling for a jurisprudence of 
"neutral principles" and a return to the 
intentions of the Founders raised the banner 
around which modern originalism was 
formed. The standard was taken up a few 
years later by then-Justice Rehnquist in his 
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lecture "The Notion of a Living 
Constitution," and soon the prolific Raoul 
Berger had entered the fray with his book 
Government by Judiciary. The movement 
achieved major success with dizzying speed 
when Ronald Reagan was elected president 
and his attorney general, Edwin Meese, 
oversaw fundamental change in the federal 
judiciary. 
Of course, original ism was not-and is 
not-the entirety of the conservative legal 
movement. There has always been a vocal 
libertarian element, especially with the rise 
of the law and economics movement. 
Similarly, there has been a strain of legal 
conservatism that rejects originalism on the 
one hand and libertarian ideology on the 
other. But when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation, original ism has been the 
default theory of legal conservatism, and it 
is appropriate to look at how original ism 
developed for insight into the broader 
movement. 
As Princeton professor Keith Whittington 
has explained, the conservative legal 
movement of the early years was "reactive" 
and "motivated by substantive disagreement 
with the recent and then-current actions of 
the Warren and Burger courts." As such, 
"the primary commitment within this critical 
posture was to judicial restraint." 
This was the restraint of Harlan's Lochner 
dissent resurrected, with its emphasis on 
deference to legislative majorities. Bork 
made the connection between the Warren 
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut 
and the Lochner Court's infamous opinion 
quite explicit, as did Rehnquist. The call for 
a judiciary that was deferential to legislative 
enactments was a theme of this period. 
All that soon began to change. Scholars 
began to place less emphasis on the judicial 
restraint of Bork and Rehnquist. It was not 
so much that judicial restraint lost pride-of-
place in originalist theory as much as the 
conception of restraint transformed. 
Whittington captured this new way of 
thinking about restraint in his book 
Constitutional Interpretation: "An originalist 
Court may well find itself quite active in 
striking down legislation at odds with the 
clear requirements of the inherited text. 
Originalism requires deference only to the 
Constitution and to the limits of human 
knowledge, not to contemporary 
politicians." 
From this perspective, judicial restraint 
entails adherence to the original meaning: no 
more but also no less. Stare decisis might 
have a role to play, depending on one's 
theory of original ism, but generally if the 
originalist judge thinks a statute is 
unconstitutional, he has an obligation to 
strike it down. A judge that adopts the 
attitude of Justice Harlan-waiting until a 
law is "plainly and palpably" 
unconstitutional-is too likely to 
subordinate the Constitution to the errant 
judgment of today's self-interested 
legislators. 
That is not to say that this new view of 
judicial restraint amounted to judicial 
"activism" or disregarded the respect due to 
the political branches. The difference was 
one of emphasis: how far should a judge go 
to uphold a statute at the risk of deforming 
the Constitution? The new view thought 
Justice Harlan went too far. The old judicial 
restraint was dismissed, in the words of 
Whittington, as "judicial passivism." 
Judicial restraint used to mean that a judge 
should bend over backwards to avoid 
striking down a law, and this view was once 
widely held within the conservative legal 
community. But this idea has long since 
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faded from the scene, and judicial restraint is 
less likely to be thought of by today's legal 
conservatives as coinciding with judicial 
nonintervention. How many statutes the 
COUli strikes down is simply beside the 
point for today's legal conservative; the 
question is why the Court shuck down the 
statutes that it did. 
And so we arrive at NFIB v. Sebeli1ls. The 
chief justice's opinion displays a clear 
embrace of the old judicial restraint. He 
announces that "every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to 
save a statute from unconstitutionality." 
Although the joint dissenters would likely 
agree with this principle, the key word is 
"reasonable." The Justice Harlan conception 
of judicial restraint leads Roberts to stretch 
the language of the statute far beyond what 
the dissenters believe is reasonable-or 
indeed constitutional. 
Roberts first analyzes the individual 
mandate under the commerce and necessary 
and proper clauses of the Constitution and 
concludes that it cannot be upheld on those 
grounds. Writing for the Court, the chief 
justice invokes the canon of constitutional 
avoidance quoted above, requiring the 
justices to adopt "every reasonable 
construction" to avoid striking down the 
statute. Roberts proceeds to hold that the 
health care law does not impose a legal 
mandate to purchase health insurance. 
Rather, he reinterprets the statute as levying 
a tax on those who fail to acquire insurance, 
which he holds was a constitutional exercise 
of Congress's taxation power. 
The chief justice's opinion is full of 
acknowledgments that his interpretation is a 
creative one. He sets the bar low for 
constitutionality by saying that "the question 
is not whether that is the most natural 
interpretation of the mandate, but only 
whether it is a 'fairly possible' one." He 
concedes that "the statute reads more 
naturally as a command to buy insurance 
than as a tax," that it "states that individuals 
'shall' maintain health insurance," and that 
"the most straightforward reading of the 
mandate is that it commands individuals to 
purchase insurance." Yet, despite these 
interpretive data-and a good deal more, as 
the dissenters point out-the chief justice 
concludes that the insurance requirement 
can be justified as a tax. 
The reason Roberts does so is that his view 
of judicial restraint in NFIB v. Sebelius 
requires him to go to the limits of 
plausibility to save the statute. The 
dissenters, who express a different view of 
restraint, refuse to go that far. 
The old conception of judicial restraint is 
evident in the chief justice's theme that the 
Court is a legal-rather than political-
body. At the beginning of his opinion, he is 
at pains to state: "We do not consider 
whether the Act embodies sound policies. 
That judgment is entrusted to the Nation's 
elected leaders. We ask only whether 
Congress has the power under the 
Constitution to enact the challenged 
provisions." Then, at the conclusion, almost 
identical language: "But the Court does not 
express any opinion on the wisdom of the 
Affordable Care Act. Under the 
Constitution, that judgment is reserved to 
the people." Like the legal conservatives of 
the 1970s, the Roberts opinion emphasizes 
the modesty of the judicial role and the 
impOliance of deferring to legislative 
majorities. 
Just as the old theory of judicial restraint 
came under intellectual attack, so too does 
Roberts' opinion for the Court-and for the 
same reasons. The problem with the old 
theory of judicial restraint, so the critique 
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goes, is that in straining to sustain the will of 
today's fleeting majority, a judge may 
ignore a fairly clear constitutional command 
from the original popular sovereign: the 
people who enacted the Constitution. The 
more recent idea of restraint sees the old 
way as a straightforward abdication of a 
judge's duty to safeguard the limits of 
political power. Where a law is 
unconstitutional, it must be declared so, and 
the judge who contOlis a law to save it is 
viewed as engaging in the very activism he 
disclaims. 
This contemporary view of judicial restraint 
is on full display in the joint dissent. The 
four justices lambast the Roberts opinion: 
"The Court regards its strained statutory 
interpretation as judicial modesty. It is not. 
It amounts instead to a vast judicial 
overreaching." In a fascinating peroration, 
the dissenters appeal to the same values 
underlying the old version of judicial 
restraint, but they see it better expressed in 
their own willingness to jettison the 
health care law entirely: 
The values that should have determined our 
course today are caution, minimalism, and 
the understanding that the Federal 
Government is one of limited powers. But 
the Court's ruling undermines those values 
at every turn. In the name of restraint, it 
overreaches. In the name of constitutional 
avoidance, it creates new constitutional 
questions. In the name of cooperative 
federalism, it undermines state sovereignty. 
The clash between the chief justice's 
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is 
therefore best seen as a clash between two 
visions of judicial restraint, and two eras of 
the conservative legal movement. 
Of course, Robelis and the joint dissenters 
have nuanced views on judicial restraint, 
and NFIB v. Sebelills does not define those 
views. Justice Scalia has long advocated 
judicial modesty and deference to legislative 
majorities, as seen in his dissent in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey (1992), and the chief 
justice joined the Court's opinion in Citizens 
United v. FEC (2010) in the face of heated 
political opposition. The point here is simply 
to identify the tensions within the 
conservative legal movement evident in the 
NFIB opinions. 
The overwhelmingly negative response to 
the chief justice's analysis shows just how 
far the movement has distanced itself from 
the old theory of restraint, embracing instead 
a view that cares less about how many 
statutes are struck down than about why 
they are invalidated. For the chief justice, 
his opinion is the epitome of judicial 
modesty. For the dissenters, it is the height 
of judicial arrogance. Roberts thinks his 
actions are compelled by respect for the 
coordinate branches of government; the 
dissenters see his actions as flouting the 
Constitution that called that government into 
being. And at this moment in the history of 
the conservative legal movement, Roberts 
stood alone. 
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"No Respite for Liberals" 
The New York Times 
June 30, 2012 
Pamela S. Karlan 
Anton Chekhov once remarked that "one 
must not put a loaded rifle on the stage if no 
one is thinking of firing it." In the term that 
ended last week, the Supreme Court reached 
a liberal outcome in cases involving 
President Obama's health care law, 
Arizona's draconian immigration statute and 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles. But 
the conservative majority also laid down a 
cache of weapons that future courts can use 
to attack many of the legislative 
achievements of the New Deal and the Great 
Society-including labor, environmental, 
civil rights and consumer protection laws-
and to prevent new progressive legislation. 
Far from being a source of jubilation, the 
term may come back to haunt liberals. 
The immediate result of Thursday's 5-to-4 
health care ruling was a victory for the 
Obama administration and the millions of 
Americans who will get improved access to 
medical care. But four justices would have 
struck down every provision of the 900-
plus-page act, and Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr., who provided the fifth vote to 
uphold the mandate that individuals buy 
insurance or. pay a penalty, distanced 
himself from the law. "It is not our job," he 
wrote, "to protect the people from the 
consequences of their political choices." The 
chief justice, who at 57 is likely to sit on the 
court for at least another two decades, made 
clear that government's ability to address 
many ofthe nation's most pressing problems 
is subject to some new limitations. 
We take for granted that the federal 
government can forbid landlords to reject a 
tenant based on his race or religion; prohibit 
development on fragile wetlands; finance 
the Medicare program for the elderly; 
require public schools to give girls an equal 
opportunity to play sports; collect revenue to 
pay for the National Institutes of Health and 
the national parks; encourage energy 
conservation by taxing gas guzzlers; prohibit 
discriminatOlY voter ID laws; and vindicate 
the right of state government employees to 
take unpaid leave to care for sick relatives. 
The conservative legal movement has 
already attacked many of these provisions, 
and the Roberts comi has been steadily 
supplying it with ammunition to do so. 
Conservative judicial rhetoric-for example, 
Justice Antonin Scalia's denunciation last 
week of the Obama administration's 
decision not to deport young, law-abiding 
illegal immigrants who came to this country 
as children-may be designed to change the 
political climate as well. 
The federal government's ability to regulate 
economic and social life stems largely from 
four powers in the Constitution. Under the 
commerce clause, Congress can "regulate" 
national economic activity. Under the taxing 
power, it can "lay and collect Taxes." Under 
the spending power, it can "provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States." And under the enforcement 
powers, it can enact "appropriate 
legislation" to enforce the 14th 
Amendment's equal protection and due 
process clauses and the 15th Amendment's 
guarantee of the right to vote regardless of 
race. 
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From the 1930s through the Warren and 
Burger courts, the Supreme Court largely 
deferred to the political branches' judgments 
about the scope of these powers; it was their 
partner, not their adversary. The court 
recognized-as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
pointed out in her opinion on the health care 
case-that the political process was the 
pnmary vehicle for limiting government's 
powers. 
Under the last chief justice, William H. 
Rehnquist, the court began to turn, 
patiicularly on Congress's commerce and 
enforcement powers. The comi limited some 
statutes-notably, a section of the 
Americans With Disabilities Act that 
allowed state workers to sue their employers 
and a section of the Violence Against 
Women Act that gave victims of gender-
motivated violence the right to sue in federal 
court-but upheld others, including other 
applications of the disabilities law, a 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, and a statute criminalizing possession 
of homegrown marijuana. 
The Roberts comi has intensified the effort 
to reduce federal power. That the individual 
mandate was upheld should not overshadow 
the court's ruling on Medicaid expansion-
the part of the ruling that is most likely to 
affect other legislation in the near future. 
For the first time since the New Deal, the 
court struck down an exercise of Congress's 
spending power. It held that Congress 
lacked the power to deny Medicaid funds to 
states that refuse to expand their coverage. 
Chief Justice Roberts-joined by the liberal 
justices Stephen G. Breyer and Elena 
Kagan-held that while the government can 
deny additional Medicaid funds to states that 
refuse to expand their coverage, it cannot 
penalize them by rescinding current 
Medicaid payments. 
This is a loaded gun indeed. 
Many state and local governments, 
universities and nonprofit agencies build 
their operations around federal financing. If 
the federal government can deny them 
additional money only when it adds 
conditions the recipients must meet, it will 
be hamstrung in ensuring compliance with 
critical federal objectives. For example, the 
government gives grants on the condition 
that recipients will not discriminate on the 
basis of race, sex and disability. If Congress 
adds sexual orientation to the list-which 
seems likely at some not-too-distant point-
must it maintain existing financing for 
groups that defiantly persist III 
discriminating against lesbians and gay 
men? 
A 2000 law requires state prisons and local 
jails that get federal funds to accommodate 
inmates' religious practices. But those 
facilities received money long before the 
law was passed. Can the government 
credibly threaten to cut off funds to facilities 
that violate the law, or are its enforcement 
tools now limited? 
In less-noticed opinions, the court also 
curbed federal power in important ways. It 
rejected the government's view that drug 
company representatives should be entitled 
to oveliime under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. It seemed poised to severely restrict 
Congress's ability to give private plaintiffs 
the right to enforce consumer protection 
laws, unless they could show direct 
economic injury. (On the final day of the 
term, the court said it wouldn't decide the 
case after all.) 
In another health care case, the comi refused 
to permit state workers to sue for violations 
of their right to take sick leave for 
themselves under the Family and Medical 
46 
Leave Act. A 5-to-4 majority ignored 
evidence that although the act uses a gender-
neutral leave model, it was designed in 
significant part to protect childbearing 
women against pervasive employment 
discrimination. 
In the fall, the court will have fUliher 
opportunities to advance the conservative 
agenda. It will almost celiainly decide cases 
involving voting rights, race-conscious 
affirmative action and same-sex marriage. 
Three cases involving federal environmental 
law are already on the docket. And even 
before the court struck down Montana's 
century-old ban on corporate political 
spending, there were already a slew of new 
challenges to campaign finance regulations 
working their way toward the court. 
What, then, to make of the cOUli's landmark 
decision to uphold the individual mandate? 
Chief Justice Roberts construed the mandate 
not as a requirement that individuals 
purchase health insurance but as a choice: 
buy insurance or pay a tax. But the 
conservatives surely know that a Congress 
that can tax but not do much else-spend 
money, regulate the economy or enforce 
civil rights-will be hamstrung. Taxes are 
unpopular and nearly every Republican 
member of Congress has promised to oppose 
any additional taxes on individuals or 
businesses. 
A Congress that can advance national 
priorities only through its taxing power is a 
Congress with little power at all. That is the 
real legacy of the last term. The Supreme 
Court has given Americans who care about 
economic and social justice a reason to 
worry this Fourth of July. The court's guns 
have been loaded; it only remains to be seen 
whether it fires them. 
Pamela S. Karlan is a professor of public 
interest law at Stanford and a co-author of 
"Keeping Faith With the Constitution. " 
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"Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades" 
The New York Times 
July 24,2010 
Adam Liptak 
When Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and 
his colleagues on the Supreme Court left for 
their summer break at the end of June, they 
marked a milestone: the Roberts court had 
just completed its fifth term. 
In those five years, the court not only moved 
to the right but also became the most 
conservative one in living memory, based on 
an analysis of four sets of political science 
data. 
And for all the public debate about the 
confirmation of Elena Kagan or the addition 
last year of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, there is 
no reason to think they will make a 
difference in the court's ideological balance. 
Indeed, the data show that only one recent 
replacement altered its direction, that of 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. for Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006, pulling the 
cOUli to the right. 
There is no similar switch on the horizon. 
That means that Chief Justice Roberts, 55, is 
settling in for what is likely to be a very long 
tenure at the head of a cOUli that seems to be 
entering a period of stability. 
If the Roberts court continues on the course 
suggested by its first five years, it is likely to 
allow a greater role for religion in public 
life, to permit more participation by unions 
and corporations in elections and to 
elaborate further on the scope of the Second 
Amendment's right to bear arms. Abortion 
rights are likely to be curtailed, as are 
affirmative action and protections for people 
accused of crimes. 
The recent shift to the right is modest. And 
the cOUli's decisions have hardly been 
uniformly conservative. The justices have, 
for instance, limited the use of the death 
penalty and rejected broad claims of 
executive power in the government's efforts 
to combat terrorism. 
But scholars who look at overall trends 
rather than individual decisions say that 
widely accepted political science data tell an 
unmistakable story about a notably 
conservative court. 
Almost all judicial decisions, they say, can 
be assigned an ideological value. Those 
favoring, say, prosecutors and employers are 
said to be conservative, while those favoring 
criminal defendants and people claiming 
discrimination are said to be liberal. 
Analyses of databases coding Supreme 
Court decisions and justices' votes along 
these lines, one going back to 1953 and 
another to 1937, show that the Roberts court 
has staked out territory to the right of the 
two conservative courts that immediately 
preceded it by four distinct measures: 
In its first five years, the Roberts court 
issued conservative decisions 58 percent of 
the time. And in the term ending a year ago, 
the rate rose to 65 percent, the highest 
number in any year since at least 1953. 
The courts led by Chief Justices Warren E. 
Burger, from 1969 to 1986, and William H. 
Rehnquist, from 1986 to 2005, issued 
conservative decisions at an almost 
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indistinguishable rate-55 percent of the 
time. 
That was a sharp break from the court led by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to 
1969, in what liberals consider the Supreme 
Court's golden age and conservatives 
portray as the height of inappropriate 
judicial meddling. That court issued 
conservative decisions 34 percent of the 
time. 
Four of the six most conservative justices of 
the 44 who have sat on the court since 1937 
are serving now: Chief Justice Robelis and 
Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most 
conservative of all, Clarence Thomas. (The 
other two were Chief Justices Burger and 
Rehnquist.) Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
the swing justice on the current comi, is in 
the top 10. 
The Roberts court is finding laws 
unconstitutional and reversing precedent-
two measures of activism-no more often 
than earlier courts. But the ideological 
direction of the court's activism has 
undergone a marked change toward 
conservative results. 
Until she retired in 2006, Justice O'Connor 
was very often the court's swing vote, and in 
her later years she had drifted to the center-
left. These days, Justice Kennedy has 
assumed that crucial role at the court's 
center, moving the court to the right. 
Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in 
June, had his own way of tallying the court's 
direction. In an interview in his chambers in 
April, he said that everyone of the 11 
justices who had joined the court since 1975, 
including himself, was more conservative 
than his or her predecessor, with the possible 
exceptions of Justices Sotomayor and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg. 
The numbers largely bear this out, though 
Chief Justice Roberts is slightly more liberal 
than his predecessor, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, at least if all of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's 33 years on the court, 14 of 
them as an associate justice, are considered. 
(In later years, some of his views softened.) 
But Justice Stevens did not consider the 
question difficult. Asked if the replacement 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist by Chief Justice 
Roberts had moved the court to the right, he 
did not hesitate. 
"Oh, yes," Justice Stevens said. 
The Most Significant Change 
"Gosh," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said 
at a law school forum in January a few days 
after the Supreme Court undid one of her 
major achievements by reversing a decision 
on campaign spending limits. "I step away 
for a couple of years and there's no telling 
what's going to happen." 
When Justice O'Connor announced her 
retirement in 2005, the membership of the 
Rehnquist court had been stable for 11 
years, the second-longest stretch without a 
new justice in American history. 
Since then, the pace of change has been 
dizzying, and several justices have said they 
found it disorienting. But in an analysis of 
the court's direction, some changes matter 
much more than others. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist died soon after Justice O'Connor 
announced that she was stepping down. He 
was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, his 
former law clerk. Justice David H. Souter 
retired in 2009 and was succeeded by Justice 
Sotomayor. Justice Stevens followed Justice 
Souter this year, and he is likely to be 
succeeded by Elena Kagan. 
49 
But not one of those three replacements 
seems likely to affect the fundamental 
ideological alignment of the court. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, a conservative, was 
replaced by a conservative. Justices Souter 
and Stevens, both liberals, have been or are 
likely to be succeeded by liberals. 
Justices' views can shift over time. Even if 
they do not, a justice's place in the court's 
ideological spectrum can move as new 
justices arrive. And chief justices may be 
able to affect the overall direction of the 
court, notably by using the power to 
determine who writes the opinion for the 
court when they are in the majority. Chief 
Justice Robetis is certainly widely viewed as 
a canny tactician. 
But only one change-Justice Alito's 
replacement of Justice O'Connor-really 
mattered. That move defines the Roberts 
coUti. "That's a real switch in terms of 
ideology and a switch in terms of outlook," 
said Lee Epstein, who teaches law and 
political science at Northwestern University 
and is a leading curator and analyst of 
empirical data about the Supreme Court. 
The point is not that Justice Alito has turned 
out to be exceptionally conservative, though 
he has: he is the third-most conservative 
justice to serve on the court since 1937, 
behind only Justice Thomas and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. It is that he replaced the 
more liberal justice who was at the 
ideological center of the COUti. 
Though Chief Justice Robetis gets all the 
attention, Justice Alito may thus be the 
lasting triumph of the administration of 
President George W. Bush. He thrust Justice 
Kennedy to the court's center and has 
reshaped the future of American law. 
It is easy to forget that Justice Alito was Mr. 
Bush's second choice. Had his first 
nominee, the apparently less conservative 
Harriet E. Miers, not withdrawn after a 
rebellion from Mr. Bush's conservative 
base, the nature of the Roberts court might 
have been entirely different. 
By the end of her almost quarter-century on 
the court, Justice O'Connor was without 
question the justice who controlled the result 
in ideologically divided cases. 
"On virtually all conceptual and empirical 
definitions, O'Connor is the court's center-
the median, the key, the critical and the 
swing justice," Andrew D. Matiin and two 
colleagues wrote in a study published in 
2005 in The North Carolina Law Review 
ShOlily before Justice O'Connor's 
retirement. 
With Justice Alito joining the court's more 
conservative wing, Justice Kennedy has now 
unambiguously taken on the role of the 
justice at the center of the court, and the 
ideological daylight between him and 
Justice O'Connor is a measure of the 
Robetis court's shift to the right. 
Justice O'Connor, for her part, does not 
name names but has expressed misgivings 
about the direction of the court. 
"If you think you've been helpful, and then 
it's dismantled, you think, 'Oh, dear,'" she 
said at William & Mary Law School in 
October in her usual crisp and no-nonsense 
fashion. "But life goes on. It's not always 
positive. " 
Justice O'Connor was one of the authors of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
a 2003 decision that, among other things, 
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upheld restrictions on campaign spending by 
businesses and unions. It was reversed on 
that point in the Citizens United decision. 
Asked at the law school forum in January 
how she felt about the later decision, she 
responded obliquely. But there was no 
mistaking her meaning. 
"If you want my legal opinion" about 
Citizens United, Justice O'Connor said, 
"you can go read" McConnell. 
The Court Without O'Connor 
The shift resulting from Justice O'Connor's 
depaIiure was more than ideological. She 
brought with her qualities that are no longer 
represented on the court. She was raised and 
educated in the West, and she served in all 
three branches of Arizona's government, 
including as a government lawyer, majority 
leader of the State Senate, an elected trial 
judge and an appeals court judge. 
Those expenences informed Justice 
O'Connor's sensitivity to states' rights and 
her frequent deference to political 
judgments. Her rulings were often pragmatic 
and narrow, and her critics said she engaged 
in split-the-difference jurisprudence. 
Justice Alito's background is more limited 
than Justice O'Connor's-he worked in the 
Justice Department and then as a federal 
appeals court judge-and his rulings are 
often more muscular. 
Since they never sat on the court together, 
trying to say how Justice O'Connor would 
have voted in the cases heard by Justice 
Alito generally involves extrapolation and 
speculation. In some, though, it seems plain 
that she would have voted differently from 
him. 
Just weeks before she left the cOUli, for 
instance, Justice O'Connor heard arguments 
in H1Idson v. Michigan, a case about 
whether evidence should be suppressed 
because it was found after Detroit police 
officers stormed a home without announcing 
themselves. 
"Is there no policy protecting the 
homeowner a little bit and the sanctity of the 
home from this immediate entry?" Justice 
O'Connor asked a government lawyer. 
David A. Moran, a lawyer for the defendant, 
Booker T. Hudson, said the questioning left 
him confident that he had Justice 
O'Connor's crucial vote. 
Three months later, the court called for 
reargument, signaling a 4-to-4 deadlock 
after Justice O'Connor's departure. When 
the 5-to-4 decision was announced in June, 
the cOUli not only ruled that violations of the 
knock-and-announce rule do not require the 
suppression of evidence, but also called into 
question the exclusionary rule itself. 
The shift had taken place. Justice Alito was 
in the majority. 
"My 5-4 loss in H1Idson v. Michigan," Mr. 
Moran wrote in 2006 in Cato Supreme COUli 
Review, "signals the end of the Fourth 
Amendment"-protecting against 
unreasonable searches-"as we know it." 
The depaIiure of Justice O'Connor very 
likely affected the outcomes in two other 
contentious areas: abortion and race. 
In 2000, the court struck down a Nebraska 
law banning an abortion procedure by a vote 
of 5 to 4, with Justice O'Connor in the 
majority. Seven years later, the court upheld 
a similar federal law, the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act, by the same vote. 
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"The key to the case was not III the 
difference in wording between the federal 
law and the Nebraska act," Erwin 
Chemerinsky wrote in 2007 in The Green 
Bag, a law journal. "It was Justice Alito 
having replaced Justice O'Connor." 
In 2003, Justice O'Connor wrote the 
majority opinion in a 5-to-4 decision 
allowing public universities to take account 
of race in admissions decisions. And a 
month before her retirement in 2006, the 
comi refused to hear a case challenging the 
use of race to achieve integration in public 
schools. 
Almost as soon as she left, the court 
reversed course. A 2007 decision limited the 
use of race for such a purpose, also on a 5-
to-4 vote. 
There were, to be sure, issues on which 
Justice Kennedy was to the left of Justice 
O'Connor. In a 5-to-4 decision in 2005 
overturning the juvenile death penalty, 
Justice Kennedy was in the majority and 
Justice O'Connor was not. 
But changing swing justices in 2006 had an 
unmistakable effect across a broad range of 
cases. "O'Connor at the end was quite a bit 
more liberal than Kennedy is now," 
Professor Epstein said. 
The numbers bear this out. 
The Rehnquist court had trended left in its 
later years, issuing conservative rulings less 
than half the time in its last two years in 
divided cases, a phenomenon not seen since 
1981. The first term of the Roberts court 
was a sharp jolt to the right. It issued 
conservative rulings in 71 percent of divided 
cases, the highest rate in any year since the 
beginning of the Warren court in 1953. 
Judging by the Numbers 
Chief Justice Roberts has not served nearly 
as long as his three most recent 
predecessors. The court he leads has been in 
flux. But five years of data are now 
available, and they point almost uniformly 
in one direction: to the right. 
Scholars quarrel about some of the 
methodological choices made by political 
scientists who assign a conservative or 
liberal label to Supreme Court decisions and 
the votes of individual justices. But most of 
those arguments are at the margins, and the 
measures are generally accepted in the 
political science literature. 
The leading database, created by Harold 1. 
Spaeth with the support of the National 
Science Foundation about 20 years ago, has 
served as the basis for a great deal of 
empirical research on the contemporary 
Supreme Court and its members. In the 
database, votes favoring criminal 
defendants, unions, people claiming 
discrimination or violation of their civil 
rights are, for instance, said to be liberal. 
Decisions striking down economIC 
regulations and favoring prosecutors, 
employers and the government are said to be 
conservati ve. 
About 1 percent of cases have no ideological 
valence, as in a boundary dispute between 
two states. And some concern multiple 
issues or contain ideological cross-currents. 
But while it is easy to identify the occasional 
case for which ideological coding makes no 
sense, the vast majority fit pretty well. They 
also tend to align with the votes of the 
justices usually said to be liberal or 
conservative. 
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Still, such coding is a blunt instrument. It 
does not take account of the precedential 
and other constraints that are in play or how 
much a decision moves the law in a 
conservative or liberal direction. The mix of 
cases has changed over time. And the 
database treats every decision, monumental 
or trivial, as a single unit. 
"It's crazy to count each case as one," said 
Frank B. Cross, a law and business professor 
at the University of Texas. "But the problem 
of counting each case as one is reduced by 
the fact that the less-important ones tend to 
be unanimous." 
Some judges find the entire enterprise 
offensive. 
"Supreme Court justices do not 
acknowledge that any of their decisions are 
influenced by ideology rather than by 
neutral legal analysis," William M. Landes, 
an economist at the University of Chicago, 
and Richard A. Posner, a federal appeals 
court judge, wrote last year in The Journal 
of Legal Analysis. But if that were true, they 
continued, knowing the political party of the 
president who appointed a given justice 
would tell you nothing about how the justice 
was likely to vote in ideologically charged 
cases. 
In fact, the correlation between the political 
party of appointing presidents and the 
ideological direction of the rulings of the 
judges they appoint is quite strong. 
Here, too, there are exceptions. Justices 
Stevens and Souter were appointed by 
Republican presidents and ended up voting 
with the court's liberal wing. But they are 
gone. If Ms. Kagan wins Senate 
confirmation, all of the justices on the comi 
may be expected to align themselves across 
the ideological spectrum in sync with the 
party of the president who appointed them. 
The proposition that the Roberts comi is to 
the right of even the quite conservative 
courts that preceded it thus seems fairly well 
established. But it IS subject to 
qualifications. 
First, the rightward shift is modest. 
Second, the data do not take popular 
attitudes into account. While the court is 
quite conservative by historical standards, it 
is less so by contemporary ones. Public 
opinion polls suggest that about 30 percent 
of Americans think the current court is too 
liberal, and almost half think it is about 
right. 
On given legal issues, too, the court's 
decisions are often closely aligned with or 
more liberal than public opinion, according 
to studies collected in 2008 in "Public 
Opinion and Constitutional Controversy" 
(Oxford University Press). 
The public is largely in sync with the court, 
for instance, in its attitude toward 
abortion-in favor of a right to abortion but 
sympathetic to many restrictions on that 
right. 
"Solid majorities want the court to uphold 
Roe v. Wade and are in favor of abortion 
rights in the abstract," one of the studies 
concluded. "However, equally substantial 
majorities favor procedural and other 
restrictions, including waiting periods, 
parental consent, spousal notification and 
bans on 'patiial birth' abOliion." 
Similarly, the public is roughly aligned with 
the court in questioning affirmative action 
plans that use numerical standards or 
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preferences while approving those that allow 
race to be considered in less definitive ways. 
The Roberts court has not yet decided a 
major religion case, but the public has not 
always approved of earlier rulings in this 
area. For instance, another study in the 2008 
book found that "public opinion has 
remained solidly against the comi's 
landmark decisions declaring school prayer 
unconstitutional. " 
In some ways, the Robelis court is more 
cautious than earlier ones. The Rehnquist 
court struck down about 120 laws, or about 
six a year, according to an analysis by 
Professor Epstein. The Roberts comi, which 
on average hears fewer cases than the 
Rehnquist court did, has shuck down fewer 
laws-I5 m its first five years, or three a 
year. 
It is the ideological direction of the 
decisions that has changed. When the 
Rehnquist court struck down laws, it 
reached a liberal result more than 70 percent 
of the time. The Roberts court has tilted 
strongly in the opposite direction, reaching a 
conservative result 60 percent of the time. 
The Rehnquist comi overruled 45 
precedents over 19 years. Sixty percent of 
those decisions reached a conservative 
result. The Roberts court overruled eight 
precedents in its first five years, a slightly 
lower annual rate. All but one reached a 
conservative result. 
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"Justice Kagan-Giving Liberals a Rhetorical Lift" 
Reuters 
April 5,2012 
Joan Biskupic 
During three days of arguments over the 
Obama healthcare plan, Supreme Court 
Justice Elena Kagan put on a display of 
rhetorical firepower, reinforcing predictions 
that the newest liberal justice is best 
equipped to take on the conservative, five-
man majority controlling the bench. 
The strong views and persuasive tactics of 
the administration's former top lawyer could 
affect the fate of the health care overhaul, as 
well as decisions in other ideologically 
charged issues that will come before the 
court, such as same-sex marriage. 
Kagan's sturdy advocacy was evident to law 
professors and to lawyers who practice 
before the court during her first term. But 
the health care debate has offered her a more 
prominent platform with bigger stakes. She 
pressed her argument as ardently as any 
lawyer who stepped to the lectern. 
At the final seSSIOn on the final day of 
arguments, attorney Paul Clement, 
representing 26 states challenging the 
healthcare law, had barely uttered three 
opening sentences when Kagan pounced. 
What followed was one of the most 
aggressive exchanges of the entire three 
days. It centered on a provision expanding 
eligibility for Medicaid, the joint state-
federal program that pays for poor people's 
healthcare. Kagan tried to puncture 
Clement's argument that bringing more 
people into the program would impinge on 
states' sovereignty and further strain their 
budgets, even though the government would 
pick up 90 percent of the cost. 
The justice and the lawyer-Kagan a former 
solicitor general for Obama, Clement for 
George W. Bush-went at it for several 
minutes. When Clement eluded her, Kagan 
posed trickier scenarios to test the notion 
that states are trapped in a program that 
funnels hundreds of billions of dollars their 
way yet consumes significant state funds, 
too. 
"Wow! Wow!" Kagan exclaimed in 
disbelief, as Clement rejected her 
hypothetical offers of huge sums of money, 
which she posited anyone would accept. The 
money would not be attractive, Clement 
responded, if it "came from my own bank 
account. And that's what's really going on 
here, in part." 
GROUNDBREAKER, BUT IN A NEW 
ERA 
The exchange illuminated how Kagan, 
President Barack Obama's second Supreme 
Court appointee, who joined the bench in 
August 2010, has energized the four-
member liberal wing of the nine-member 
court. A keen strategist, she can also match 
wits with Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Antonin Scalia, the longest-serving 
conservative on today's bench. 
Her role is distinct from that of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, the conservative who is 
most likely to swing and occasionally permit 
the other side to prevail. Rather than casting 
a crucial vote, she lends a critical voice that 
could make the case for liberals within the 
court and beyond. 
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Her approach, seen in her early months and 
brought vividly to the fore during the 
health care case, suggests she may be 
adopting some of the liberal passion of her 
mentor, Thurgood Marshall, for whom she 
clerked. He also served as a solicitor 
general, during the Lyndon Johnson 
administration, before becoming the first 
African-American justice on the high court. 
Marshall, whose tenure spanned 1967-1991, 
was, with the late Justice William Brennan, 
a standard-bearer for a liberalism that has all 
but disappeared from the federal bench. 
They opposed the death penalty in every 
case, consistently boosted defendants' rights 
and favored broad-scale solutions for past 
racial discrimination. They sought to give 
judges a strong hand in remedying social 
policy disputes. 
Kagan is unlikely to embrace that activism 
of a bygone era. Yet her approach could lead 
her to oppose efforts by the conservative 
majority to reverse past rulings on race-
based remedies, or break new ground on gay 
rights. 
IDEOLOGICALLY CHARGED CASES 
Kagan's fiercest dissenting opinions on 
behalf of the liberals have so far come in 
ideologically charged cases. In an Arizona 
campaign finance dispute, she wrote that 
while the conservative majority said it had 
found the "smoking guns" at the center of 
the case, "the only smoke here is the 
majority's, and it is the kind that goes with 
mirrors." 
"It is absolutely clear. She is positioned to 
be the leader on the liberal side," said 
Harvard University law professor Mark 
Tushnet. "It was incredible," he said of the 
exchange with Clement. "She was just not 
going to let him go. She had the questions 
all set up." 
In the months preceding the court's 
health care hearing, conservative groups and 
prominent Republicans, including Senate 
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, 
questioned whether Kagan should sit on the 
case because she had worked as a high-level 
lawyer under Obama when the healthcare 
law and strategy for its defense was being 
developed. 
The overhaul, which includes a mandate that 
most Americans buy insurance by 2014, is 
intended to bring coverage to more than 32 
million uninsured people in the United 
States. 
Kagan testified during her summer 2010 
confirmation hearings that she did not work 
on healthcare litigation, and administration 
officials have since said she was walled off 
from discussions on how to defend the law. 
Challengers say Congress exceeded its 
constitutional authority with the mandate 
and Medicaid expansion. 
Chief Justice Robelis implicitly backed 
Kagan and Justice Clarence Thomas on 
January 1 when he wrote in an annual report 
on the judiciary: "I have complete 
confidence in the capability of my 
colleagues to determine when recusal is 
warranted." Liberal groups had urged 
Thomas not to sit, because his wife, 
Virginia, a Tea PaIiy activist, has opposed 
the healthcare law. 
HUNTING PHEASANT AND 
CRACKING WISE 
If anyone had thought Justice Kagan might 
pull her punches during arguments because 
of the criticism she faced for not recusing 
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herself, they were wrong. She defended the 
Obama heaIthcare plan with a vigor that 
might have been expected if she were still 
Obama's first solicitor general. 
"I was surprised that she didn't try to seem a 
little more balanced. She was certainly up 
there with her perspective," said Carrie 
Severino, a former law clerk to Thomas who 
is chief counsel of the Judicial Crisis 
Network, a conservative advocacy group 
that focuses on legal issues and was one of 
the organizations that had questioned 
Kagan's participation in the case. 
Kagan, who declined to be interviewed for 
this story, has made friends with colleagues 
on both sides. The Manhattan native, who as 
dean of the Harvard law school brought in 
more conservative professors to a campus 
dominated by liberals, has taken up skeet 
shooting and pheasant hunting with Scalia, 
her ideological opposite. 
For all her toughness with attorneys who 
stand before the cOUli, Kagan is also mindful 
of her place. Last week she was cut off by 
senior justices and had forgotten her 
question by the time her turn came. Quipped 
the court's newest appointee: "See what it 
means to be the junior justice?" 
The views she has brought to the court are 
not lost on fellow liberals, particularly 
veteran Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who 
since her own 1993 appointment has 
witnessed the conservative takeover of the 
court. 
Ginsburg has praised Kagan's rhetorical 
skills and "powerful" and "forceful" 
opinions-and her use of humor. In a speech 
in New York last July, Ginsburg cited 
Kagan's bench reading of one of her first 
court opinions. "If you understand anything 
I say here, you will likely be a lawyer, and 
you will have had your morning cup of 
coffee." The daughter of a lawyer and a 
school teacher, Kagan became the first 
woman to hold the post of solicitor general 
when President Obama selected her in 2009. 
She had never argued a case before the court 
but, with her background in the classroom 
and navigation of campus politics, she 
swiftly proved herself a daunting presence. 
Her style is one of concise, declarative 
sentences. 
Representing the Obama administration at 
the lectern, she sometimes clashed with 
Chief Justice Roberts. In a case involving 
potentially competing stances within the 
Department of Justice, he called her 
argument "absolutely startling." Kagan 
stood her ground: "The United States 
government is a complicated place." 
She has also expressed respect for Roberts. 
Referring to his years as an appellate lawyer, 
she referred to him as "the great Supreme 
Court advocate of his time." 
STANDOUT DISSENTS 
In her first full term, Kagan aligned herself 
most with Obama's only other appointee. 
According to figures compiled by the 
SCOTUSblog, a site now partially 
sponsored by Bloomberg Law, she voted 
with Sonia Sotomayor 94 percent of the 
time, with Ginsburg 91 percent, and Stephen 
Breyer, the fOUlih liberal justice, 87 percent. 
She was least in accord with Justice 
Thomas, at 66 percent. 
More than her votes, it is her opmlOns-
mainly in dissent-that have made her stand 
out. She took the lead to protest a 5-4 
decision in an Arizona case allowing state 
tax credits that benefited religious schools, 
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insisting the decision "damages one of this 
nation's defining constitutional 
commitments," that of religious liberty. 
On the last day of the 2010-11 term, Kagan 
led dissenters in a separate hot-button 
Arizona case, as the majority invalidated a 
state law that gave extra funding to political 
candidates who used the public-finance 
system rather than relied on private backers. 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority. 
The dueling opinions revealed the energetic 
style of the two young leaders: He is 56, she 
turns 52 this month. When Kagan wrote that 
challengers to the Arizona law showed 
"chutzpah," Roberts countered, "The charge 
is unjustified." As much as they both 
employed long citations of law and 
precedent, they also used punchy two-word 
sentences. One of his: "Not so." One of hers: 
"Me too." 
SPEAKER FOR THE LEFT 
Last week's healthcare arguments, testing 
Obama's major domestic achievement, 
illustrated Kagan's robust approach and her 
potential to speak for the left. 
She jumped in when administration lawyers 
faltered, responded to conservative justices' 
questions about the Obama position, and 
came on strong when Clement was at the 
lectern. 
During arguments over the new insurance 
mandate, premised on the notion that 
everybody will eventually need medical 
care, the lead lawyer for the state 
challengers said: "The government can't say 
that everybody is in that (healthcare) market. 
The whole problem is that everybody is not 
in that market, and they want to make 
everybody get into that market." 
Kagan replied: Wasn't that "cutting the 
baloney thin? Health insurance exists only 
for the purpose of financing healthcare. The 
two are inextricably interlinked. We don't 
get insurance so that we can stare at our 
insurance certificate. We get it so that we 
can go and access healthcare." 
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"Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists" 
The Wall Street JOllrnal 
June 29,2012 
John Yoo 
White House judge-pickers sometimes ask 
prospective nominees about their favorite 
Supreme Court justice. The answers can 
reveal a potential judge's ideological 
leanings without resorting to litmus tests. 
Republican presidential candidates similarly 
promise to appoint more judges like so-and-
so to reassure the conservative base. 
Since his appointment to the high court in 
2005, the most popular answer was Chief 
Justice John Roberts. But that won't remain 
true after his ruling on Thursday in NFIB v. 
Sebelills, which upheld President Barack 
Obama's signature health-care law. 
Justice Roberts served in the Reagan Justice 
Department and as a White House lawyer 
before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme 
Court by President George W. Bush. Yet he 
joined with the court's liberal wing to bless 
the greatest expansion of federal power in 
decades. 
Conservatives are scrambling to salvage 
something from the decision of their once-
great judicial hero. Some hope Sebeli1ls 
covertly represents a "substantial victory," 
in the words of conservative columnist 
George Will. 
After ail, the reasoning goes, Justice 
Roberts's opinion declared that the 
Constitution's Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to regulate inactivity, 
which would have given the federal 
government a blank check to regulate any 
and all private conduct. The court also 
decided that Congress unconstitutionally 
coerced the states by threatening to cut off 
all Medicaid funds if they did not expand 
this program as far as President Obama 
wants. 
All this is a hollow hope. The outer limit on 
the Commerce Clause in Sebelills does not 
put any other federal law in jeopardy and is 
undermined by its ruling on the tax power 
(discussed below). The limits on 
congressional coercion in the case of 
Medicaid may apply only because the 
amount of federal funds at risk in that 
program's expansion-more than 20% of 
most state budgets-was so great. If 
Congress threatens to cut off 5%-10% to 
force states to obey future federal mandates, 
will the cOUli strike that down too? 
Doubtful. 
Worse still, Justice Roberts's OpInIOn 
provides a constitutional road map for 
architects of the next great expansion of the 
welfare state. Congress may not be able to 
directly force us to buy electric cars, eat 
organic kale, or replace oil heaters with solar 
panels. But if it enforces the mandates with 
a financial penalty then suddenly, thanks to 
Justice Roberts's tortured reasoning in 
Sebeli1ls, the mandate is transformed into a 
constitutional exercise of Congress's power 
to tax. 
Some conservatives hope that Justice 
Roberts is pursuing a deeper political game. 
Charles Krauthammer, for one, calls his 
opinion "one of the great constitutional 
finesses of all time" by upholding the law on 
the narrowest grounds possible-thus doing 
the least damage to the Constitution-while 
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turning aside the Democratic Party's 
partisan attacks on the court. 
The comparison here is to Marb1lry v. 
Madison (1803), where Chief Justice John 
Marshall deflected President Thomas 
Jefferson's similar assault on judicial 
independence. Of the Federalist Party, 
which he had defeated in 1800, Jefferson 
declared: "They have retired into the 
judiciary as a stronghold. There the remains 
of federalism are to be preserved and fed 
from the treasury, and from that battery all 
the works of republicanism are to be beaten 
down and erased." Jeffersonians in Congress 
responded by eliminating federal judgeships, 
and also by impeaching a lower court judge 
and a Supreme Court judge. 
In Marb1t1y, Justice Marshall struck down 
section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, thus 
depriving his own court of the power to hear 
a case against Secretary of State James 
Madison. Marbury effectively declared that 
the court would not stand in the way of the 
new president or his congressional 
majorities. So Jefferson won a shOli-term 
political battle-but Justice Marshall won 
the war by securing for the Supreme COUli 
the power to declare federal laws 
unconstitutional. 
While some conservatives may think Justice 
Robetis was following in Justice Marshall's 
giant footsteps, the more apt comparison is 
to the Republican Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes. Hughes's court struck down 
the centerpieces of President Franklin 
Roosevelt's early New Deal because they 
extended the Commerce Clause power 
beyond interstate trade to intrastate 
manufacturing and production. Other 
decisions blocked Congress's attempt to 
delegate its legislative powers to federal 
agencies. 
FDR reacted furiously. He publicly 
declared: "We have been relegated to a 
horse-and-buggy definition of interstate 
commerce." After winning a resounding 
landslide in the 1936 elections, he responded 
in February 1937 with the greatest attack on 
the courts in American history. His 
notorious court-packing plan proposed to 
add six new justices to the Supreme COUli's 
nine members, with the obvious aim of 
overturning the court's opposition to the 
New Deal. 
After the president's plan was announced, 
Hughes and Justice Owen 1. Roberts began 
to switch their positions. They would vote to 
uphold the National Labor Relations Act, 
minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws, 
and the rest of the New Deal. 
But Hughes sacrificed fidelity to the 
Constitution's original meaning in order to 
repel an attack on the cOUli. Like Justice 
Roberts, Hughes blessed the modern welfare 
state's expansive powers and unaccountable 
bureaucracies-the very foundations for 
ObamaCare. 
Hughes's great constitutional mistake was 
made for nothing. While many historians 
and constitutional scholars have referred to 
his abrupt and unprincipled about-face as 
"the switch in time that saved nine," the 
court-packing plan was wildly unpopular 
right from the start. It went nowhere in the 
heavily Democratic Congress. Moreover, 
further New Deal initiatives stalled in 
Congress after the congressional elections in 
1938. 
Justice Roberts too may have sacrificed the 
Constitution's last remaining limits on 
federal power for very little-a little peace 
and quiet from attacks during a presidential 
election year. 
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Given the advancing age of several of the 
justices, an Obama second term may see the 
appointment of up to three new Supreme 
Court members. A new, solidified liberal 
majority will easily discard Sebelills's limits 
on the Commerce Clause and expand the 
taxing power even further. After the Hughes 
court switch, FDR replaced retiring Justices 
with a pro-New Deal majority, and the court 
upheld any and all expansions of federal 
power over the economy and society. The 
court did not overturn a piece of legislation 
under the Commerce Clause for 60 years. 
If a Republican is elected president, he will 
have to be more careful than the last. When 
he asks nominees the usual question about 
justices they agree with, the better answer 
should once again be Scalia or Thomas or 
Alito, not Roberts. 
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"Enumerating Conservatism's Long-term Victory" 
The Boston Herald 
July 1,2012 
George F. Will 
Conservatives won a substantial victory on 
Thursday. The physics of American 
politics-actions provoking re-actions-
continues to move the crucial debate, about 
the nature of the American regime, toward 
conservatism. Chief Justice John Roberts 
has served this cause. 
The health care legislation's expansion of 
the federal government's purview has 
improved our civic health by rekindling 
interest in what this expansion threatens-
the Framers' design for limited government. 
Conservatives distraught about the survival 
of the individual mandate are missing the 
considerable consolation prize they won 
when the Supreme Court rejected a 
constitutional rationale for the mandate-
Congress' rationale-that was pregnant with 
rampant statism. 
The case challenged the court to fashion a 
judicially administrable principle that limits 
Congress' power to act on the mere pretense 
of regulating interstate commerce. At least 
Roberts got the court to embrace emphatic 
language rejecting the Commerce Clause 
rationale for penalizing the inactivity of not 
buying insurance: 
"The power to regulate commerce 
presupposes the existence of commercial 
activity to be regulated. . . . The individual 
mandate, however, does not regulate 
existing commercial activity. It instead 
compels individuals to become active in 
commerce by purchasing a product, on the 
ground that their failure to do so affects 
interstate commerce. Construing the 
Commerce Clause to permit Congress to 
regulate individuals precisely because they 
are doing nothing would open a new and 
potentially vast domain to congressional 
authority .... Allowing Congress to justify 
federal regulation by pointing to the effect 
of inaction on commerce would bring 
countless decisions an individual could 
potentially make within the scope of federal 
regulation, and-under the government's 
theory-empower Congress to make those 
decisions for him." 
If the mandate had been upheld under the 
Commerce Clause, the cOUli would have 
decisively construed this clause so 
permissively as to give Congress an 
essentially unlimited police power-the 
power to mandate, proscribe and regulate 
behavior for whatever Congress deems a 
public benefit. Instead, the court rejected the 
Obama administration's Commerce Clause 
doctrine. The court remains clearly 
committed to this previous holding: "Under 
our written Constitution ... the limitation of 
congressional authority is not solely a matter 
oflegislative grace." 
The court held that the mandate IS 
constitutional only because Congress could 
have identified its enforcement penalty as a 
tax. The cOUli thereby guaranteed that the 
argument ignited by the mandate will 
continue as the principal fault line in our 
polity. 
The mandate's opponents favor a federal 
government as James Madison fashioned it, 
one limited by the constitutional 
enumeration of its powers. The mandate's 
supporters favor government as Woodrow 
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Wilson constmed it, with limits as elastic as 
liberalism's agenda, and powers acquiring 
derivative constitutionality by being 
necessary to, or efficient for, implementing 
government's ambitions. 
By persuading the court to reject a 
Commerce Clause rationale for a president's 
signature act, the conservative legal 
insurgency against Obama-care has won a 
huge victory for the long haul. This will help 
revive a venerable tradition of America's 
political culture, that of viewing 
congressional actions with a skeptical 
constitutional squint, searching for 
congmence with the Constitution's 
architecture of enumerated powers. By 
rejecting the Commerce Clause rationale, 
Thursday's decision reaffirmed the 
Constitution's foundational premise: 
Enumerated powers are necessarily limited 
because, as Chief Justice John Marshall said, 
"the enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated. " 
When Nancy Pelosi, asked where the 
Constitution authorized the mandate, 
exclaimed, "Are you serious? Are you 
serious?" she was utterly ingenuous. People 
steeped in Congress' culture of unbridled 
power find it incomprehensible that the 
Framers fashioned the Constitution as a 
bridle. Now, Thursday's episode in the 
continuing debate about the mandate will 
reverberate to conservatism's advantage. By 
sharpening many Americans' constitutional 
consciousness, the debate has resuscitated 
the salutary practice of asking what was, 
until the mid-1960s, the threshold question 
regarding legislation. Is it proper for the 
federal government to do this? 
Conservatives can rekindle the public's 
interest in this barrier by building upon the 
victory Roberts gave them in positioning the 
court for stricter scmtiny of congressional 
actions under the Commerce Clause. 
Any democracy, even one with a written and 
revered constitution, ultimately rests on 
public opinion, which is shiftable sand. 
Conservatives understand the patience 
requisite for the politics of democracy-the 
politics of persuasion. Elections matter 
most; only they can end Obamacare. But in 
Roberts' decision, conservatives can see the 
court has been persuaded to think more as 
they do about the constitutional language 
that has most enabled the promiscuous 
expansion of government. 
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"Chief Justice Roberts Signals That 
Supreme Court Remains Independent" 
The Los Angeles Times 
June 30, 2012 
David G. Savage 
Despite widely held assumptions that he is 
reliably conservative, Chief Justice John G. 
Robetis Jr. ruled in favor of the Obama 
administration on the new healthcare law and 
Arizona's tough immigration law. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. considers it 
an insult when he hears it said that he and the 
justices are playing politics. He has always 
insisted his sole duty was to decide the law, 
not to pick the political winners. 
Until this week, however, not many were 
inclined to believe him. Those on the left-
and the right-were convinced they could 
expect Roberts to be a reliable vote on the 
conservative side. 
But no more. The chief justice took control of 
two of the biggest politically charged cases in 
a decade, involving the Affordable Care Act 
and Arizona's immigration law, and he 
fashioned careful, lawyerly rulings that 
resulted m victories for the Obama 
administration. 
Those who were surprised might have taken 
note of the man Robetis describes as one of 
his heroes-Chief Justice Charles Evan 
Hughes, a progressive Republican who was 
chief justice in the 1930s when President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the court clashed 
over the New Deal. 
When the high court and the Roosevelt 
administration seemed headed for a 
constitutional showdown, Hughes persuaded 
one wavering justice to switch sides and vote 
to uphold a minimum-wage law and a 
collective bargaining measure. The "switch in 
time that saved the nine" defused FDR's plan 
to load up the Supreme COUli with additional 
justices appointed by him. The cOUli-packing 
plan died in the Senate. The deft leadership by 
Hughes preserved the court as an independent 
institution. 
This year's court battle over the healthcare 
law did not rise to the level of the New Deal-
era clash. But had the Roberts cOUli struck 
down Obama's healthcare law, Democrats and 
progressives would be making those historic 
comparisons this week. 
"It was masterful. Roberts believes in a 
modest role for the court, and he was doing 
just what he promised he would do," said 
Stanford law professor Michael W. 
McConnell, a former appeals court judge 
appointed by President George W. Bush. "Had 
the court struck down the law, they would 
have been the focal point of the campaign. 
Now, the court comes out with its reputation 
enhanced." 
Acting on his own, Roberts saved the 
Affordable Care Act from being struck down 
as unconstitutional before it could go into 
effect. His four fellow conservatives had voted 
in favor of Republican state officials to void 
the Democrats' healthcare measures that were 
decades in the making. 
Roberts, however, found a narrow way to 
uphold the law as an exercise of Congress' 
taxing power. "Because the Constitution 
permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid 
it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness," he 
wrote in an opinion joined in part by the 
four liberal justices. 
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And in the immigration dispute between 
Arizona and the Obama administration, 
Roberts led a 5-3 majority Monday that said 
federal officials, not the states, had "broad 
discretion" in deciding whether to arrest and 
deport illegal immigrants. The ruling blocked 
Republican-led states from moving to 
aggressively enforce immigration laws on 
their own. 
The message from Roberts was that the high 
court, even in a heated election year, was an 
independent institution and an enforcer of the 
Constitution-not a friendly forum for just 
one party or one side of the ideological divide. 
But no one should expect that Roberts has 
moved left. Next term, the court will take on 
college affirmative action and possibly gay 
marriage, and Roberts is likely to take a 
conservative stand. 
Still, this week's rulings surprised much of 
Washington, where the partisan divide is so 
deep that few anticipated a nonpartisan 
decision. Republican leaders had been 
preparing to celebrate the demise of Obama's 
healthcare law. Because the court had five 
Republican appointees, their assumption was 
the law would go down on a 5-4 vote. 
Counting the same votes, Democrats and 
liberal groups were prepared to launch a 
political campaign against what they would 
describe as the pro-business, right-wing 
Roberts court. 
The healthcare ruling would be paired with 
Citizens United, the 2010 decision that led to a 
gusher of new political spending. 
In that case Roberts, with some hesitation, 
joined a 5-4 opinion written by Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy that extended free-
speech rights to corporate groups and unions. 
At first, Roberts tried to fashion a narrow 
ruling that would have allowed Citizens 
United, a small nonprofit group, to sell a DVD 
that derided Hillary Rodham Clinton, then a 
Democratic candidate for president. But 
Kennedy insisted on a much broader opinion 
that struck down the long-standing ban on 
campaign spending. Roberts then joined to 
make the majority. 
This time, by contrast, the chief justice kept 
control of the healthcare opinion. With four 
conservatives on his right and four liberals on 
his left, he chose the narrow, middle-ground 
ruling. He agreed with the conservatives it was 
unconstitutional to "compel" Americans to 
buy products, but he also agreed with the 
liberals that the insurance mandate could be 
upheld as a tax. 
Kennedy, ousted from his spot at the center of 
the action, delivered an angry, stinging dissent 
Thursday that accused the chief justice of 
"vast overreaching" and having "invented" a 
way to uphold the law. 
Constitutional experts said that when 
considering what was at stake, the chief justice 
deserves enormous credit. 
Harvard Law School professor Richard 
Lazarus, who has known Roberts since their 
student days, said Thursday's opinion shows 
he "does what he thinks is the right 
interpretation of the law, not what he thinks is 
necessarily popular or to curry favor." 
Conservatives said they were disenchanted. 
"Make no mistake: Chief Justice Roberts' 
opinion is a sellout of constitutional principle 
of the highest magnitude," said Chapman 
University law professor John Eastman. 
For his part, the chief justice said he was glad 
to leave Washington for a summer teaching 
trip to Malta. It's "an impregnable island 
fortress," he told a group of judges Friday, 
tongue in cheek. "It seemed like a good idea." 
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"The Mystery of John Roberts" 
The Ney\l York Times 
July 11,2012 
Linda Greenhouse 
In November 1991, the Supreme Court 
heard argument in Lee v. Weisman, on the 
question of whether a prayer recited by a 
member of the clergy at a public high school 
graduation violated the constitutional 
separation of church and state. The vote 
after argument was 5 to 4 to allow the 
prayer. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
gave the opinion-writing assignment to 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. 
Some months later, Justice Kennedy sent a 
note to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the 
senior justice on the dissenting side. He had 
changed his mind, Justice Kennedy said; the 
argument against allowing the prayer was 
the better interpretation of the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause. Justice 
Blackmun, now the senior justice in the 
majority, had the prerogative of reassigning 
the opinion. He told Justice Kennedy to keep 
writing. 
When the 5-to-4 decision to prohibit 
graduation prayers was finally announced on 
June 24, 1992, it was huge news. From 
today's perspective, it may not sound like a 
big deal. But Lee v. Weisman was one of the 
hot-button cases of the 1991 term, perhaps 
second only to Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, the abortion case that challenged the 
continued validity of Roe v. Wade. 
President George H. W. Bush was mnning 
for re-election, and having put both David 
H. Souter and Clarence Thomas on the 
Supreme Comi, he was eager to show the 
religious right that he was the rightful heir of 
his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. His 
solicitor general, Kenneth W. Starr, made 
the unusual move of filing a brief asking the 
court to take the case, even though as a legal 
matter the federal government's interest in 
the outcome was far- fetched. As an 
administration official explained to me at the 
time, the strategy was to provide a vehicle 
for Justice Souter to declare himself 
lowering the church-state barrier (a 
profound misjudgment of this Yankee 
Republican, who voted with the majority). 
Justice Kennedy's position was patiicularly 
galling across the conservative spectrum: the 
wounds from the 1987 defeat of Robert H. 
Bork's nomination were still raw, and 
Justice Kennedy held the seat the Reagan 
administration had intended for Robert 
Bork. 
But did disappointed conservatives, inside or 
outside the Supreme Court, run crying to the 
press? They did not. The behind-the-scenes 
drama remained largely unknown until 
Justice BIackmun's papers became available 
at the Library of Congress 12 years later. 
Terry Eastland, writing in The American 
Spectator in Febmary 1993, said there were 
rumors suggesting that Justice Kennedy had 
switched his position, but in the pre-Internet 
age, the repmi received little traction. (There 
were widespread rumors that in the Planned 
Parenthood decision, issued five days after 
Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy had 
switched his vote to join the 5-to-4 majority 
in upholding the right to abortion, but my 
own inside-the-court conversations at the 
time refuted that suspicion.) 
The obvious reason for this trip down 
memory lane is to draw a then-and-now 
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comparison with the torrent of right-wing 
leaks in the immediate aftermath of the 
decision to uphold the Affordable Care Act. 
I'm not surprised by the claim that the 
crucial vote by Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. to uphold the health-care 
mandate under the Congressional tax power 
represented a late switch, having suggested 
that scenario myself in a column written the 
day of the decision. But I'm amazed by the 
leaks (to be clear, I had none) and by the 
invective that continues to be heaped on the 
chief justice. 
Ramesh Ponnuru, a senior editor of National 
Review and leading conservative blogger, 
wrote that Chief Justice Roberts "acted less 
like a judge than like a politician, and a 
slippery one." Randy Barnett, a Georgetown 
University law professor and intellectual 
father of the Commerce Clause argument 
against the statute, predicted on the Volokh 
Conspiracy blog that "it's hard to imagine 
Republican politicians citing John Roberts 
as the type of justice they favor nominating 
in the future" (odd, because the Robelis 
opmlOn, actually accepting Professor 
Barnett's Commerce Clause analysis, has 
left liberals seriously alarmed about the 
court's future direction on congressional 
power). Clint Bolick, a leading libertarian 
who advocates aggressive activism-sorry, 
"engagement"-by the court to shrink 
government power, wrote in The Wall Street 
J01lrnal that "the upshot is that Chief Justice 
Robelis has become a 'swing' justice on the 
Supreme Court" and is no longer a "solid 
conservative. " 
Mr. Bolick also wrote that the chief justice's 
supposed vote switch has the effect of 
"magnifying the harm" of the decision. This 
is a common theme of the conservative 
critics, although why that should be the case 
is not self-evident. One asserted reason for 
concern is that the switch reveals the chief 
justice's vulnerability-now and in the 
future-to blandishments from the 
establishment to do the right thing, to care 
about his reputation and that of the comi. I 
think this notion is close to fatuous. The 
chief justice is an astute student of history 
whose recreational reading includes 
biographies of former chief justices. He 
didn't need to be reminded by a handful of 
liberal pundits and political leaders that 
there was a lot riding on his role in this case. 
I doubt there was a single reason for the 
chief justice's evolution (I know, 
conservatives hate that word in the context 
of Supreme Court justices' ideological 
trajectories), but let me suggest one: the 
breathtaking radicalism of the other four 
conservative justices. The opinion pointedly 
signed individually by Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. would have invalidated the entire 
Affordable Care Act, finding no one part of 
it severable from the rest. This astonishing 
act of judicial activism has received 
insufficient attention, because it ultimately 
didn't happen, but it surely got the chief 
justice's attention as a warning that his 
ostensible allies were about to drive the 
Supreme Comi over the cliff and into the 
abyss. (Extraneous question: Is the liberal 
love affair with Anthony Kennedy-which 
should have ended five years ago with his 
preposterously patronizing opmlOn in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal 
Partial-Birth AbOliion Ban Act of 2003 and 
suggesting that women are incapable of 
acting in their own best interests-finally 
over?) 
Students of the court more interested in 
seeking to understand rather than denounce 
the chief justice's performance have offered 
valuable insights in recent days. Steven M. 
Teles, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins 
University and author of the commendable 
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"The Rise of the Conservative Legal 
Movement," suggested in The Washington 
Monthly that Chief Justice Roberts was not 
comfortable with "sweeping uses of judicial 
power to limit government." Professor Teles 
said that while the chief justice was 
"sympathetic" with his fellow conservatives, 
he "simply lacks the taste for the jugular that 
they have, either as a result of his role as 
chief justice or his prudential sense of how 
far it is reasonable for the court to go in 
using its power." 
A Harvard law student, Joel Alicea, in a 
smart post on the conservative Web site The 
Public Discourse, wrote that the health care 
decision revealed "a clash between two 
visions of judicial restraint and two eras of 
the conservative legal movement." If Chief 
Justice Robelis, nearly a generation younger 
than Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in fact 
represents the old form of legal 
conservatism, in which the judicial role is to 
salvage statutes if possible rather than 
eviscerate them in the service of a bigger 
agenda, that's a fascinating and highly 
consequential development. 
And it may be just such a fear that explains 
the anger and angst, the willingness of the 
leakers-as opposed to disappointed 
conservatives of an earlier era-to burn the 
cOUli down in order to delegitimize one 
whom they happily claimed as their own 
only weeks ago. The fissures on the 
conservative side of the court may already 
be opening over how to approach next 
term's big cases on affirmative action (scrap 
it or confine it) and voting rights (declare the 
landmark Voting Rights Act obsolete, and 
therefore unconstitutional, or yield to the 
nearly unanimous vote by which Congress 
extended the law's Section Five for another 
25 years). The first case is already on the 
court's docket, and the other is on its way, 
neither by happenstance. Both cases were 
created by conservative interest groups, 
primed and nurtured and pushed to the 
Supreme Court on the assumption that the 
moment for radical activism had finally 
arrived. 
Is John Roberts the new swing justice? I 
have strong doubts. The man is conservative 
to his bones. So the real question is what the 
word "conservative" means in 2012 and the 
decades ahead. And that's a mystery much 
more important to solve than who leaked 
and why. 
Readers of this column know from my 
regular references to Judge Richard Posner 
of the federal appeals court in Chicago that 
he is one of my favorite judges. A pragmatic 
libertarian and prolific author, Judge Posner 
has the enviable quality of being willing to 
say out loud exactly what he thinks. So his 
comment on what may lie ahead for John 
Roberts, in a July 5 interview with Nina 
Totenberg of NPR, was perhaps not 
surprising, but 1 still found it amazing. Here 
is what he said: 
"I mean, what would you do if you were 
Roberts? All of a sudden you find out that 
the people you thought were your friends 
have turned against you, they despise you, 
they mistreat you, they leak to the press. 
What do you do? Do you become more 
conservative? Or do you say, 'What am 1 
doing with this crowd of lunatics.' Right? 
Maybe you have to reexamme your 
position. " 
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"Analysis: Roberts Sent Message of Court's Legitimacy" 
The Washington Post 
June 30, 2012 
Dan Ba1z 
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered more 
than a historic ruling with his opinion 
upholding the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act. Deliberately or not, he 
sent a message to politicians about the 
impOliance of protecting the vitality and 
reputation of public institutions. 
That's a message badly needed III 
Washington and nowhere more so than in 
the Capitol building that sits across the 
broad lawn from the Supreme Court. 
Congress is an institution designed to 
represent the people. It has become a body 
where too often its members act as if they 
represent only Republicans or only 
Democrats. No wonder so many Americans 
hold it in such low regard. 
It is useful to remember that, in the run up to 
the ruling, one strong subtext of analysis 
was what a decision striking down President 
Obama's health-care law would do to the 
court itself. Would the court, under those 
circumstances, be vulnerable to the charge 
that it had become as politicized as the other 
branches of government? 
Connecting the dots 
Fearing defeat, Democrats were preparing to 
make the court a target in the fall election. 
They were connecting the dots, from the 
ruling that handed the presidency to George 
W. Bush, to the Citizens United decision 
that helped unleash a torrent of big-money 
contributions in this year's election cycle (a 
huge share of the money going to GOP 
super P ACs), and, finally, to health care and 
a decision that would have been seen as 
toppling the president's signature 
accomplishment. 
No Supreme Court is ever immune from the 
political currents swirling at any given time. 
But the assumption of most Americans is 
that the court, of the three branches of 
government, should be insulated from 
partisan politics. Its decisions may offend 
one side or the other, but its legitimacy 
should remain inviolate. 
Had a majority of the justices struck down 
Obamacare, the court-fairly or unfairly-
would have become a bigger issue in the 
presidential campaign than usual and in 
ways that could have been damaging to its 
authority. 
How much the court's place and reputation 
entered into Roberts' thinking may never be 
known. Someday, the full story of how he 
found his way to writing a majority opinion 
on the health-care case with the four liberal 
justices may become known. The opinion he 
wrote was, in the estimation of some legal 
experts, either tortured or fiendishly clever 
in maneuvering toward an outcome that 
upheld the constitutionality of the health 
care law while attempting to adhere to 
conservative principles aimed at restraining 
the powers of the federal government. 
One can only imagine how Obama, the 
former constitutional law professor, 
analyzed the opinion and how he evaluated 
the motivations of the chief justice who, 
surprising to some, handed him a major 
legal and political victory in the middle of 
his tight re-election campaign. 
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A particularly testy relationship 
That was all the more intriguing because the 
president and the chief justice have had a 
particularly testy relationship. It began with 
Obama's speech outlining his opposition to 
Roberts' nomination in 2005. He said 
Roberts had the intellect and temperament to 
sit on the court but questioned whether he 
had the values and healt not to side with the 
strong over the weak. 
Their relationship may have reached its 
nadir when Obama publicly rebuked Roberts 
and the court for the Citizens United 
decision as the justices sat before him in the 
House chamber during his 2010 State of the 
Union address. 
Roberts' detractors believe that he 
reinterpreted what Congress said in the 
legislation to find a legal justification for 
upholding it-by defining the individual 
mandate as a tax. For that, he is taking 
considerable heat from conservatives. But he 
also handed Republicans a new justification 
to attack Obama for raising taxes. 
Roberts wrote that he was not making a 
judgment about the wisdom of the policy; he 
said only that it was constitutionally 
permissible. He has thrown the debate over 
health care back into the political arena. 
Those who looked to the court to redress 
political grievances over a health-care law 
that was passed on a party-line vote have the 
oppOltunity to win their case in the court of 
public opinion, which is the right place 
given all its history. 
In his act of judicial activism, as some of his 
cntlcs have described it, Roberts 
demonstrated restraint of a different kind-a 
bow to the political branches of government 
to exercise their powers within the broad 
framework of the Constitution. If it was 
judicial activism, it was in the service of 
institutional deference. The chief justice 
helped remind the country that each branch 
of government has particular powers, 
responsibilities and obligations. The 
legislative branch is designed for partisan 
debate but, ultimately, it is there to make 
laws and solve problems that it alone can 
solve. 
On one of the most politically charged cases 
in years, the chief justice chose to exercise 
the leadership that goes with his position. He 
may have protected his institution at the 
same time. The members of Congress have 
not done that very often in recent years. That 
is one lesson they can take away from the 
court's historic ruling. 
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in "Chief Justice" Mean?" 
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Lyle Denniston 
The statements at issue: 
"His job is not to finesse the place of the 
Supreme Court in the political world, in 
which he and most justices are rank 
amateurs, but to get the Constitution right 
first and then defend the institution second." 
- John Y 00, law professor at the University 
of California-Berkeley, in an email message 
published July 3 by The New York Times. 
He was commenting on leaks to the news 
media that Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 
Jr., had switched positions from striking 
down the new federal health care law to 
upholding it. 
"There is speculation in conservative circles 
that Roberts had intended to strike down 
Obamacare but flipped his position at the 
last minute. We don't know if he was 
suddenly convinced by his liberal colleagues 
or simply had a failure of nerve." 
- Marc A. Thiessen, fellow of the American 
Enterprise Institute in Washington, in an op-
ed column July 7 in The Washington Post, 
commenting on the same news reports. 
We checked the Constitution, and ... 
The Chief Justice of the United States-that 
is the correct title-is one of the few top 
federal officials whose job was created 
explicitly in the Constitution. By tradition, 
the Chief is also the head of the judicial 
branch and is its dominant administrator. 
And, if the federal courts' reputation is 
suffering, or those comis are under political 
siege, it is to the Chief that the other 
justices-and perhaps the nation's people-
look for restoration of its stature, and maybe 
its power, too. 
After seven terms as Chief Justice, John G. 
Roberts, Jr., probably has not had his 
leadership tested as much as now. When he 
returns from a two-week teaching 
assignment in Malta, and retreats to his 
summer home in Maine, he almost celiainly 
will start thinking about that challenge, and 
whether he needs to do something about it. 
He can have no doubt that many 
conservative politicians, pundits, and 
academics are thoroughly displeased with 
his votes in the health care case. (When 
those tempers cool, though, they will 
discover on closely reading his opinion that 
Chief Justice Roberts has not abandoned any 
of his conservative philosophy, and, indeed, 
has given a strong push to the limited 
government sentiment that now runs so 
deeply in conservative circles.) 
But the Chief Justice's problem, if he has 
one right now, is not solely with 
conservative critics outside the Court. It now 
appears that the internal deliberations of the 
Court were the subject of very substantial 
leaks from inside, and those leaks were 
framed in a way that challenged his 
leadership in fashioning a majority to 
resolve the Affordable Care Act 
controversy. Mr. Thiessen's comment in The 
Post that the Chief Justice may have 
suffered "a failure of nerve" is an echo of 
what the leaks had indicated was an internal 
complaint, too. 
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It is almost celiainly not in Roberts' power 
to stop such leaks altogether. But, as the 
Chief, he does have the prestige and the 
rank-and perhaps the obligation-to lead the 
Court back toward renewed collegiality and 
common purpose. He is known to want to 
keep the Court above politics, as much as 
possible, and that may very well account for 
the way he voted on health care. He almost 
surely is fully aware of the criticism that the 
Roberts Court is a partisan bastion, but now, 
the sniping from inside might just reinforce 
such an image-unless the Chief moves to 
ease the tension. 
But dealing with that is an internal task; 
Roberts also faces a task that involves the 
world outside the Court, and not just to woo 
back America's conservatives. 
Although Professor Y 00 sought to lecture 
the Chief Justice on his priorities, that 
critique suffered from two flaws. First, 
there was no "right" way to decide the 
health care case; that the Court was deeply 
divided on almost all parts of the ruling 
showed that mature minds can differ on 
basic questions of constitutionality. The 
Court is not "wrong" just because it 
displeases some of the public. 
Second, because the Chief Justice is the 
public face of the court, he must have a 
highly developed sensitivity to when it is 
getting into political trouble. A Chief Justice 
must be constantly aware of that in the 
digital age, when a negative response to the 
court can go viral instantly. 
As a student of the court's history, Roberts 
surely is aware of what may have been the 
finest moment in the career of one of his 
predecessors. And, despite Professor Y 00, 
this previous Chief Justice did not consider 
his external obligations to be secondary. 
That Chief, of course, was Charles Evans 
Hughes. In 1937, with the Court in the midst 
of the constitutional cnSlS over its 
independence of the White House, it was 
Hughes' public and private maneuvering 
that helped seal the doom of President 
Franklin Roosevelt's COUli-packing plan. 
Had that plan succeeded, it might well have 
destroyed the Court. 
In a column in The Nation magazine in May 
1937, when the Roosevelt plan was going 
down to defeat, columnist Robert S. Allen 
wrote: "Few realize how important a part 
Mr. Hughes has played in the fight against 
the court bill. He has conducted his 
operations with consummate deftness and 
finesse-and tremendous effectiveness." 
Hughes did it, though, with the suppOli of 
his colleagues. The leaks from within the 
Roberts Court do raise some doubt about 
whether this Chief can count on solidarity 
from within. 
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